Umwelt, Lebenswelt and Dasein seen through the lens of a subjective experience of reality by Wąsik, Zdzisław
126 Zdzisław Wąsik
Umwelt, Lebenswelt and Dasein seen through 
the lens of a subjective experience of reality
Zdzisław Wąsik
Faculty of English, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań,
al. Niepodległości 4, 61-874 Poznań, Poland, 
e-mail: zdzis.wasik@gmail.com
Abstract. Depar ting from estimations of existential universes of animals (umwelt) 
and humans (Lebenswelt and Dasein), this paper observes a number of views on the 
subjective experience, or modelling systems of reality, developed in the philosophy of 
nature and culture. The first part examines how the semantic relationships of non-
human and human organisms with their environments are outlined in phenomenology 
as a study of individual experience from a subject-oriented perspective. Respectively, 
animals are admitted to have meaningful relations with actual things in observable 
reality through an outward extension of their bodies, but they are stated to lack direct 
access to things in themselves and to their various forms of being, because they cannot 
transcend the imprisonment in their surroundings. In the second part, exposing the 
mundane background of semiotic phenomenology, the existence modes of animal 
and human subjects are considered in terms of being-in-the-world as immanence and 
being-for-the-world as transcendence. Immanent subjects are seen as existing in their 
environments and transcendent subjects as being able to go beyond their Lebenswelten. 
In keeping with positively marked or unmarked interpretations of existence and life 
in the subjective universes of humans and animals, made by other philosophers and 
psychologists, the author arrives at a conclusion that the extension of the study of reality 
and the world might enrich the framework of existential semiotics if  the organisms’ 
relations to the world they dwell in were considered from the viewpoint of their 
becoming in the world and the becoming of the world as a result of their interactions.
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1. Subjective universes of animals and humans 
as semiotic spheres
In the first part of this paper, the terms ‘umwelt’, introduced by Jakob von Uexküll 
(1864–1944), a Baltic German biologist and philosopher of nature, and ‘Lebenswelt’, 
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put into use by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), a German mathematician and philo-
sopher of humanity, are interpreted with regard to animal and human environ ments 
on the basis of their terminological applications and interpretation in existentialist 
phenomenology, philosophy of biology, and biological semiotics (for pertinent details, 
see Wąsik 2001 and Sonesson 2006; as well as Zlatev 2007, 2009 as to historical and 
typological outlines of the concept of meaning). 
1.1. The phenomenology of the animal world 
in the light of biosemiotics
The term ‘umwelt’, denoting the ‘surrounding world’, derives its semantic connotation 
from Jakob von Uexküll who has investigated how living organisms perceive their 
environment and how this perception determines their behaviour. Pertaining to the 
subjective world of an organism, this term was coined by Uexküll in his book Umwelt 
und Innenwelt der Tiere as early as in 1909. As Kalevi Kull (1999: 390) has remarked, 
“in his article of 1907 he still uses the term ‘Milieu’, as different from ‘Außenwelt’” (cf. 
Uexküll 1907). Soon afterwards, in 1920, this framework was enriched with a new 
term ‘Umweltröhre(n)’ [‘environmental pipe(s)’] introduced in Uexküll’s Theoretische 
Biologie (1926[1920] and 1928/1920/). Moreover, in the second edition of Umwelt 
und Innenwelt der Tiere (1921[1909]), a complementary term was added, namely, 
‘Funktionskreis’ (rendered in English as ‘functional circle’ or lately also as ‘functional 
cycle’), as a clue to understanding meaning in biological terms within the umwelt of 
an organism (cf. Uexküll, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, 1921[1909]). Accordingly, 
metaphorically modelled as a “soap bubble”, umwelt may be discussed as denoting a 
particular environment of an animal acting at a given moment in a ‘functional circle’ 
(Funktionskreis) consisting of medium, food, enemy or sex (cf. Uexküll, “The theory 
of meaning”, 1982[1940]: 59–60, especially 71), and Umweltröhren appear to be useful 
for showing a sequence of all environmental circles that the individual organism has 
to pass in a stroll throughout its whole life understood as a determined journey. This 
investigative method of pursuing and reconstructing the journey through invisible 
worlds is demonstrated in the works of Jakob von Uexküll and Georg Kriszat, 
Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen. Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer 
Welten (1992/1957/[1934]), and Jakob von  Uexküll‘s Niegeschaute Welten: Die Um-
welten meiner Freunde. Ein Erinnerungsbuch (1936).
Having studied the behaviour of organisms which enter into relationships with 
their environments, Uexküll noticed that animals at all levels – from unicellulars 
to hominids, as living systems endowed with the so-called Ich-Ton, i.e., a property 
of subjectivity, rendered as ‘ego-quality’ in the English translation of the original 
German terms signifying musical tones – are capable of discerning meanings from 
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environmental indicators. According to Uexküll certain objects of the environment 
can become meaning-carriers, and function as such, when they possess qualities 
that are significant for the fulfilment of subject-related needs, as, e.g., Weg-Ton 
(‘path-quality’), Wurf-Ton (‘throw-quality’), Trink-Ton (‘drinking-quality’), Fress-
Ton (‘eating-quality’), Sitz-Ton (‘sitting-quality’), Hindernis-Ton (‘obstacle-quality’), 
Kletter-Ton (‘climbing quality’), etc. (Uexküll 1982: 27–31).
1.2. Interpreting the phenomenology of life-world 
in terms of the sign-behaviour of human animals
Another kind of a subjective universe was proposed by Edmund Husserl in pheno-
menology under the label of ‘Lebenswelt’, describing the pre-given world in which 
humans live. The spherical dimension of human surroundings is visible in Husserl’s 
definition provided during his lectures held in Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, 
under the title Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phäno menologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, published for 
the first time in 1954 and translated into English as The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy 
in 1970: 
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as 
coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-man” and all of us together, 
belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is 
our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this “living 
together”. (Husserl 1970[1954]: 108)
In his definition of Lebenswelt, Husserl adheres to a dualistic division between 
empirical and rational facts insisting upon the separation of the sensible and the 
intelligible. This split generates the consequence that the conception of one life-world 
encompasses two distinct worlds, namely the world of nature and the psychic world 
(Husserl 1970[1954]: 60).
Husserl’s theory of the ‘rational world’ raises the question of how to use the concept 
of ‘world’ to designate a discrete domain or closed special regions. It is significant that 
Husserl links the widespread use of ‘world’ to the appearance of a special subject-
oriented psychology that combines both empiricism and rationalism to generate “a 
psychophysical anthropology in the rationalistic spirit”. A phenomenological concept 
of world in Husserl’s interpretation should not only overcome the hitherto prevailing 
opposition between empiricism and rationalism, but also have the extent to include 
simultaneously the spiritual world, the ideals world and the life-world (cf. Husserl 
1970[1954]: 62).
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Thus, Husserl’s conception of ‘life-world’ demands a more authentic understanding 
of subjectivity and objectivity, as far as to live is always to live-in-certainty-of-
the-world. Waking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly 
conscious of the world and oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing 
[erleben]  and actually effecting the  ontic certainty of the world. Thereby, world is 
pregiven in every case in a way in which individual things are given. Still, there exists 
a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way 
we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in 
the sense of the life-world), though together the two make up an inseparable unity (cf. 
Husserl 1970[1954]: 142–143).
It was, however, slightly earlier, in his manuscript from 1890 “Zur Logik der Zeichen 
(Semiotik)” [‘On the logic of signs (semiotics)’], that Husserl (1970/1890/) gave some 
attention to the origins of sign behaviour. His explanation may be summarized 
in four statements: firstly, all animals react to phenomena as signs of existentially 
relevant objects or situations; secondly, when they are able to grasp causal or regular 
connections between some parts of situations, they usually choose these as signs of the 
whole; thirdly, when communication occurs with the use of signs it must be preceded 
by sign consciousness (Zeichenbewusstsein); and, finally, that at further evolutionary 
stages the users of signs must be aware of regular effects of their intended use(s). 
1.3. The reality of everyday life as an intersubjective world
On the margin of the presentation of Husserl’s Lebenswelt, it should be added that the 
term ‘life-world’, used in mundane phenomenology as the translation of the German 
original, was abandoned by the authors of The Social Construction of Reality, Peter 
Ludwig Berger (1929–2017), and Thomas Luckmann (1927–2016), in favour of the 
term “the reality of everyday life” understood as a socially constructed world (cf. 
Berger, Luckmann 1966: 23). The term was continued in the work of Alfred Schütz 
(1899–1959), an Austrian philosopher and sociologist, first in the English and then 
German editions, by Thomas Luckmann (cf. Schütz, Luckmann, Strukturen der 
Lebenswelt. 1975[1973], following Schütz’s Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. 
Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, 1932). 
As Berger and Luckmann (1966: 23) wrote:
Th e reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective 
world, a world that I share with others. Th is intersubjectivity sharply diff erentiates 
everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world 
of my dreams, but I know that the world of everyday life is as real to others as it is 
to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting 
and communicating with others.
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According to the conviction of social constructivists, society is the creator of know-
ledge, although an individual human being, as an organism, de facto experiences the 
reality while receiving various kinds of information from the environment. The stock 
of everyday knowledge is created due to social interactions; this knowledge is, as can 
be said, following Berger and Luckmann (1966: 19–46), negotiated and approved 
among particular members of society. An individual can have access to the subjectivity 
of other individuals. What is more, Berger and Luckmann (1966: 34) argue:
Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in 
products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to 
other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more 
or less enduring indices of the subjective process of their producers, allowing 
their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be 
directly apprehended.
In voice communication, sound waves are objectivated as elements of common world:
A special but crucially important case of objectivation is signifi cation, that is, the 
human production of signs. A sign may be distinguished from other objectivations 
by its explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings. To be sure, 
all objectivations are susceptible of utilization as signs, even though they were not 
originally produced with this intention. (Berger, Luckmann 1966: 35)
Thus, to sum up, human expressivity is clearly manifested in products accessible both 
to their creators and to other people. These real objects which are observable and 
which become symptoms of actions – or their meaning-bearers – were considered by 
Berger and Luckmann as elements of the common world. 
1.4. Animal symbolicum on the evolutional scale of 
communication systems
On reading Husserl’s ideas pertaining to the awareness of signs, Ernst Cassirer (1874–
1945) expressed his opinion on the mutual relationships between the sensuous bearer 
of meaning and the meaning itself in several places of his Philosophie der symbolischen 
Formen (cf. Cassirer 1955[1923–1929], 1995). However, he had created his human-
centred phenomenology of symbolic forms directly under the influence of his 
contemporary scientific colleague at the University of Hamburg, namely his friend 
Jakob von Uexküll. As Frederik Stjernfelt pointed out when discussing the topic of 
simple animals and complex biology, Uexküll had a twofold influence on Cassirer’s 
philosophy. The first influence of Uexküll upon Cassirer was connected with the 
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conception of “an Umwelt (surrounding world), determined by its specific Bauplan 
and the possibility it yields for classes of perceptions and actions” and the second, 
according to the account of Frederik Stjernfelt (2011: 171), with the definition of man 
as “the animal symbolicum” (Stjernfelt 2011: 172).
Entering into the epistemology of biology, Cassirer (1962/1944/: 24), in his conclu-
sive work An Essay on Man from 1944, poses the question: “Is it possible to make 
use of the scheme proposed by Uexküll for a description and characterization of the 
human world?” Thereafter, he answers it as follows: “Obviously this world forms no 
exception to those biological rules that govern the life of all the organisms. Yet, in the 
human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of 
human life … a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system” (see Cassirer 
1962/1944/: 24). As he further explains: 
[M]an lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of 
this universe. […] Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense 
constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic 
forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see 
or know anything except by the interpretation of this artifi cial medium. […] He 
lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions 
and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams. (Cassirer 1962/1944/: 24)
With regard to philosophical anthropology, Cassirer, based on research on the mental 
capacity of apes, argued that animal behaviour includes only signals, but not symbols. 
Even when practical imagination and intelligence is attributed to an animal, it is 
only man who has the power of “a symbolic imagination and intelligence” (Cassirer 
1962/1944/: 33). As he furthermore claimed, higher-order apes can communicate 
symbolically under specific conditions created by humans, and some birds are 
able to categorize different objects and to learn songs while creating their melodic 
varieties. However, a two- or three-year-old child not only learns, but also masters 
its own language. The range of symbolic forms and genres may include zoosemiotic 
systems, but, on the other end of the evolutionary scale marking the first civilizations 
of humans, there is the emergence of mathematics and scientific knowledge. 
1.5. On three levels of modelling the mundane reality 
in the semiotics of nature and culture
The background of Cassirer’s concept of symbolic forms was noticed by Thomas 
A. Sebeok (orig. Sebők, 1920–2001) in his paper “Von Vico zu Cassirer zu Langer” 
(cf. 1994[1992]) placing him between the historiosophical thought of Giambattista 
Vico (1668–1744) and the philosophy of Susanne Langer (1895–1985), pertaining to 
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mentalist symbolism in language and art. What is also worth mentioning here is the 
rapport between Vico and Juri Lotman (1922–1993), the promoter of a textual view 
of culture as a semiosphere, discussed in Tuuli Raudla’s article “Vico and Lotman: 
poetic meaning creation and primary modelling” (2008).
In conformity with Uexküll’s and Cassirer’s separation of animal and human 
universes based on a semiotic opposition between the signs of nature and the symbols 
of culture while being opposed to the distinction of primary and secondary modelling 
systems suggested by Lotman, Sebeok postulated the existence of three levels of 
the modelling of reality, answering the question (posed at the Semiotic Society of 
America Meeting in 1987): “In what sense is language a ‘primary modelling system’?” 
(cf. Sebeok 1988). 
In his theses, first published in 1967 under the title “Тезисы к проблеме ‘Искусство 
в ряду моделирующих систем’” [“The place of art among other mo delling systems”], 
Lotman (2011[1967]: 250) describes a model as “an analogue of an object of perception 
that substitutes for it in the process of perception”. Accordingly, in his view: “Modelling 
activity is human activity in creating models. In order that the results of this activity 
could be taken as analogues of an object, they have to obey certain (intuitively or 
consciously established) rules of analogy and, therefore, be related to one modelling 
system or another” (Lotman 2011[1967]: 250). Accordingly, “A modelling system is a 
structure of elements and rules of their combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy 
to the whole sphere of the object of perception, cognition, or organization. For this 
reason, a modelling system may be treated as a language” (Lotman 2011[1967]: 250).
While taking a stand on Lotman’s position by posing the question, “In what 
sense is language a ‘primary modelling system’?”, Sebeok puts forward his modelling 
systems theory based on the discrimination between non-verbal communication and 
verbal systems. At the same time, he mentions that it is very likely that the Homo 
habilis had the capacity of language without any verbal expression, claiming that: 
“Solely in the genus Homo have verbal signs emerged. To put it in another way, only 
hominids possess two mutually sustaining repertoires of signs, the zoosemiotic 
non-verbal, plus, superimposed, the anthroposemiotic verbal” (Sebeok 1988: 55). 
According to Sebeok, what the Russo-Estonian semioticians call “primary”, i.e., the 
anthroposemiotic verbal, is “phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to 
the nonverbal; and, therefore, what they call ‘secondary’ is actually a further, tertiary 
augmentation of the former” (Sebeok 1988: 55).
In his studies on the semiotic self under the title A Sign is Just a Sign, Sebeok 
postulates three modelling systems of reality (cf. Sebeok 1991[1979]; 1991). 
Accordingly, following the semioticians of nature and culture, the primary modelling 
system (PMS) of reality is located on the level of animals possessing the ego-quality 
which acts through the mediation of effectors and receptors, i.e., on the level of 
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indexical symptoms and appealing signals. The secondary modelling system (SMS) 
involves, in turn, the extralinguistic reality of everyday life construed by the use of 
verbal means of signification and communication, which occurs as such only in the 
realm of human organisms. The tertiary modelling system (TMS), which includes the 
secondary one, is characterized as encompassing the whole semiosphere of language 
and culture and civilization where the representations of extrasemiotic reality are 
artificially created in accordance with axiological (value-and-good-oriented) and 
praxeological (function-and-purpose-oriented) principles.
Describing the triadic relationship between “developmental” stages of an individual 
organism in terms of anthroposemiosis, Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi have 
maintained that (1) PMS is “the system that predisposes the human infant to engage 
in sense-based forms of modelling”; (2) SMS – “the system that subsequently impels 
the child to engage in extensional and indexical forms of modelling”; and (3) TMS – 
“the system that allows the maturing child to engage in highly abstract (symbol-
based) forms of modelling” (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 10).
2. Interpreting the being modes of human subjects in 
terms of existential semiotics
In the second part of the article, a search for the roots of existential semiotics 
characterized by the category of Dasein, which is central to the mundane pheno-
menology of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), begins with rethinking the layout of 
the human-centred semiotics developed by Eero Tarasti in the light of philosophers 
who pay attention to ‘existence’ as a dwelling in the real world and ‘transcendence’ 
as going beyond the concrete reality and starting a trans-mundane journey to other 
realities through the acts of subjective sign-and-meaning-creation (semiosis). Two of 
Tarasti’s subsequent works published in the last decades, namely, “What is existential 
semiotics? From theory to application” (2009) and Sein und Schein. Explorations in 
Existential Semiotics (2015), appear to be most advanced as a theoretical framework 
for the purposes of detailed consideration.
2.1. The worldhood of the world through the vantage point of 
Dasein as being-in-the world
The existential relationship of the human subject with the world in which he lives 
should especially be exposed on the basis of Heidegger’s works with special reference 
to Sein und Zeit (1962[1927], “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (1998[1929], and Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit (1995[1983]).
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As Heidegger noted in 1929, Sein und Zeit constitutes the second of three different 
approaches to the problem of the world (see Heidegger 1995[1983]: 176–177). The 
first approach in “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (1998[1929]) deals with the historical 
development of the word and the concept of world. The second approach, in Sein 
und Zeit (1926–1927), addresses “the phenomenon of world by interpreting the way 
in which we at first and for the most part move about in our everyday world” (see 
Heidegger 1995[1983]: 177). The third one, discussed in its turn in Die Grundbegriffe 
der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit (1929–1930), is based on a “comparative exa-
mination” of man, animals, plants and stones (see Heidegger 1995[1983]: 177).
What makes Sein und Zeit distinctive is its emphasis on the world not as a concept 
but as a phenomenon (das Weltphänomen). A phenomenon describes something that 
becomes “manifest” and “shows itself in itself ” (see Heidegger 1962[1927]: 28–29). 
Thus, the world as a phenomenon should give us the world itself. As Heideg ger 
explains, his attempt was “to provide a preliminary characterization of the pheno-
menon of world by interpreting the way in which we at first and for the most part move 
about in our everyday life” (Heidegger 1995[1983]: 177). Following Heidegger’s path of 
reasoning, how he approaches the world from the vantage point of Dasein, as being-
in-the-world, we might therefore grasp the phenomenon of the world: “That which is 
so close and intelligible to us in our everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally 
remote and unintelligible to us” (Heidegger 1995[1983]: 177). 
What Heidegger addresses in his third approach are thus the three concepts, 
namely ‘world’, ‘finitude’, and ‘solitude’, which form a unity. The discussion of 
animality must therefore be contextualized as belonging to this broader analysis of 
metaphysics and the essence of man. Without a doubt, Heidegger’s famous tripartite 
thesis constitutes an attempt to understand the essence of “the other beings which, 
like man, are also part of the world”, with regard to their relationship to and difference 
from the “having world” that marks man: “[1.] the stone (material object) is wordless; 
[2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming” (Heidegger 1995[1983]: 
177).
2.2. Philosophical positions of existential semiotics
The foundations for a human-centred paradigm of existential semiotics were laid by 
Tarasti at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS, Helsinki–Imatra, 11–17 June 2007. To 
understand Tarasti’s contribution (made public for the first time in 2009 and précised 
lately in 2015) to the semiotic-existential interpretation of transcendental forms 
of human subjects who cross the boundaries of their life-world by means of signs 
and sign-processing activities, one should especially examine the relationship and 
the difference between the understanding of existentialism in the works of Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980). 
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The sources and way of thinking of Heidegger and Sartre were completely unrelated. 
Heidegger’s development path departs from that of the forerunners of existentialism, 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), made known through Afsluttende uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler (1941[1846]), and Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), 
having been acknowledged for Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1962[1946/1913/]). 
The direction of Sartre’s reasoning, expressed in “La transcendance de l’ego: Esquisse 
d’une description phenomenologique” (1990/1960[1936–1937]) and L’Être et le 
néant : Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique (1956[1943]), stems from the speculative 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), inaugurated in Critik der reinen Vernunft 
(cf. 1941[1846]) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) resulting from the 
dissemination of ideas derived from Phänomenologie des Geistes (cf. Hegel 1977/1910/ 
[1952/1807/]). Therefore, Tarasti proposed to go back to Hegel, the first philosopher 
who characterized his approach to reality as ‘phenomenology’ alluding to Kant, but 
who, unlike Kant, expressed his conviction that phenomena constitute a sufficient 
basis for a universal science of being.
Having departed from phenomenology as the study of human experience con-
sciously realized by the senses (or lived through) from a subjective or first-person 
point of view, Tarasti concentrated on rethinking the layouts of human-centred 
semiotics in the light of selected philosophers who paid attention to the notions, such 
as, inter alia, ‘subject’, ‘existence’, ‘transcendence’, and ‘value’. These selected semiotics-
based concepts were placed on the philosophical background of such notional 
categories of existential phenomenology as ‘Umwelt’, ‘Lebenswelt’ and ‘Dasein’.
The primary point of reference in Tarasti’s inquiry that started with the question 
“What is existential semiotics?” (2009), and was representatively summarized in Sein 
und Schein (2015), consisted in the categories ‘An-sich-sein’ (‘being-in-itself ’) and 
‘Für-sich-sein’ (‘being-for-itself ’) discerned by Hegel in his Phänomenologie des Geistes 
(1977/1910/[1952/1807/]). These categories subsequently turned into subjective and 
objective being in the philosophy of Kierkegaard (1941[1846]) when he spoke about 
an individual as an observer of him- or herself or the observed one who was said to be 
a subject or such an individual who was what he/she was because he/she had become 
like it.
Sartre, an attentive reader of both Hegel (1977/1910/[1952/1807/]) and Kierke gaard 
(1941[1846]), referred to Hegelian concepts using the French terms, namely,  ‘être-en-
soi’ and ‘être-pour-soi’.1 For Sartre ([1956[1943]), the being as such becomes aware of 
itself through an act of negation and, when becoming an observer of itself, it shifts its 
interest into the position of being for itself. Having noticed a lack in its reality, the being 
begins with the first act of transcendence as far as it strives to fulfil what it lacks. 
1 Cf. the original source of citation in Sartre’s L’Être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phéno méno-
logique (1956[1943]: 124–125).
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2.3. Individual and social being forms of human body in 
the semiotic phenomenology
In his studies on Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1977/1910/[1952/1807/]), Tarasti 
(2009, 2015) was influenced by Jacques Fontanille, one of the main representatives of 
the Paris School of Semiotics. Following Fontanille’s corporeal semiotics after his book 
Soma et séma. Figures du corps (Fontanille 2004: 22–23), Hegelian categories ‘An-
sich-sein’ and ‘Für-sich-sein’ were further extended in Tarasti’s existential semiotics 
(cf. Tarasti 2009: 1761–1763; 2015: 22–24) through ‘An-mir-sein’ and ‘Für-mich-sein’ 
[‘être-en-moi’ (‘being-in-myself ’) and ‘etre-pour-moi’ (‘being-for-myself ’)]. 
In his appropriation of Hegelian categories, Fontanille (2004) has presented a 
distinction between individual and social being forms of human body (soma) in an 
entirely new phenomenological sense (séma). Accordingly, he has proposed to detach 
two kinds of body-related meanings for human agents (actants) while separating 
the body experienced inside of their organism as a flesh, which forms the centre of 
all physiological and semiotic processes, from the body observed outside of their 
organism, which shapes their uniqueness and behavioural characteristics. 
In fact, Fontanille has proposed a distinction between ‘Moi’ and ‘Soi’ as two 
categories referring to the same acting individual. According to Fontanille (2004: 
22), the body as a flesh constitutes the totality of the material resistance or impulse 
to meaning-making processes. The body is thus a sensorial driving support of all 
organismic experiences. Hence, on the one hand, in Fontanille’s (2004: 22–23) view, 
there is a body that constitutes the identity and directional principle of the flesh, being 
the carrier of the personal ‘me’ (‘Moi’), and on the other hand, the body that supports 
the ‘self ’ (‘Soi’), constructing itself in a discursive activity. As Fontanille has assumed, 
the Soi is that part of ourselves, which me, Moi, projects out of itself to create itself 
in its activity. Likewise, the Moi is that part of ourselves to which the Soi refers when 
establishing itself. In Tarasti’s interpretation (cf. 2009: 1761): “The Moi provides the 
Soi with impulse and resistance whereby it can become something. In turn, the Soi 
furnishes the Moi with the reflexivity that it needs to stay within its limits when it 
changes. The Moi resists and forces the Soi to meet its own alterity.” Hence, Moi and 
Soi are to be seen as inseparable. 
Although Fontanille departs from the viewpoint of semiotics, being influenced 
by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917–1992), the promoter of structural semantics (cf. 
Greimas, Sémantique structurale: recherche de méthode, 1966; Greimas, Sémiotique 
et sciences sociales, 1976; and Fontanille, Greimas, Sémiotique des passions: des états 
de choses aux états d’âme, 1991), his reasoning suits the phenomenological categories 
of Hegel distinguished in Phänomenologie des Geistes (1977/1910/[1952/1807/]). 
In accordance with his proposal, a new interpretation of ‘An sich’ and ‘Für sich’ is 
involved, the former corresponding to the bodily ego, and the latter to its stability 
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and identity and its aspiration outward, or the Sartrean negation. The Soi functions 
as a kind of memory of the body or Moi; it yields its form to those traces of tensions 
and needs that have been inserted in the flesh of the Moi. Anyhow, before pondering 
which consequences this distinction has to existential semiotics, it is necessary to 
scrutinize the principles of Moi and Soi as such. Consequently, anything belonging 
to the category of ‘Mich’ (‘me’), concerns the subject as an individual entity, whereas 
the concept of ‘Sich’ (‘him-/her-/it-self ’) has to be reserved for the social aspect of this 
subject. 
When one thinks about the identity and individuality of an organism, one can 
distinguish in it two aspects: Moi and Soi. In ‘me’, the subject appears as such, as a 
bundle of sensations, and in ‘himself ’, ‘herself ’ or ‘itself ’, the subject appears as 
observed by others or socially determined. These labels, Moi and Soi, connote 
the existential and social aspects of the subject or, rather, the individual and com-
munitarian sides of the whole self as an investigative object of neosemiotics.
2.4. Human subjects in existential acts of self-awareness 
After considering the phenomenological scaffolds of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des 
Geistes (1977/1910/[1952/1807/]), Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1962[1927]) and Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (1995[1983]), Sartre’s “La transcendance de l’ego” 
(1990/1960/[1936–1937] and L’Être et le néant (1956[1943]) as well as Fontanille’s 
Soma et séma (2004), which have influenced Tarasti in elaborating a semiotic model 
of the corporeal and mental, individual and social existence modes of human subjects 
in the real world and the transcendence from it into other realities, it is worth 
enumerating the four modality acts of their self-awareness, reconstituted in a cohesive 
description (cf. Tarasti 2009: 1766, or 2015: 25): 
(1) Being-in-myself – An-mir-sein – être-en-moi in which an individual is willing to 
appreciate his/her/its existential bodily self-worth; 
(2) Being-for-myself – Für-mich-sein – être-pour-moi in which the individual can 
reflect upon him-/her-/it-self while transcending to the position of an “observer”; 
(3) Being-in-itself – An-sich-sein – être-en-soi, in turn, in which an individual 
transcends to probable chances that he/she/it must either actualize or not actualize 
in society; 
(4) Being-for-itself – Für-sich-sein – être-pour-soi in which an individual refers to an 
actual role he knows how to perform in the existential world of society. 
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3. Life and existence of (non)human organisms as conscious 
being-in-the-world, being-for-the world and becoming-of-
the-world. Concluding remarks and investigative postulates
Summarizing the similarities and differences between the existential modes of non-
human and human subjects in terms of their being-in-the-world as immanence, 
and being-for-the-world as transcendence, one can say that immanent subjects are 
assumed to exist in or with their environments and transcendent subjects as able to 
exceed the universe of their (human) life.
A significant dissimilarity between animals and humans, discussed within the 
framework of existential phenomenology and subject-centred semiotic pheno-
menology, is noticeable in the meaning of ‘life’ and ‘existence’ in terms of conscious 
awareness of being alive and taking a stand on the existence in the surroundings and 
existing for the surroundings. 
On the margin of this discussion, it has to be admitted that the world of life-
and-death is considered to be common for all systems described (metaphorically?) 
as ‘living’ by representatives of anti-speciesism. Yet, following the terminological 
distinctions encountered in some languages of the world, their users have to be aware 
that the notions of ‘life’ and ‘death’ are restricted only to the world of humans. As a 
matter of fact, some languages discern the difference between ‘living’, ‘breathing’ and 
‘vegetating’ (along with their synonyms) versus ‘dying/deceasing’, ‘decaying/declining’, 
‘rotting/perishing’, or ‘wilting/withering’, and the like. 
What is important is the statement that all organisms cohabit (dwell in) the same 
world Therefore it might be assumed that, considering the relations of organisms to 
the world they cohabit, their becoming in the world and, subsequently, the becoming 
of the world is a result of these relations. 
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Умвельт, Lebenswelt и Dasein сквозь призму субъективного 
опыта действительности
Исходя из оценок экзистенциальных миров животных (умвельт) и людей (Lebenswelt  и 
Dasein), в настоящей статье рассматриваются разные точки зрения на субъективный 
опыт, разные моделирующие системы реальности, разработанные в философии 
культуры и природы. В первой части исследуется, как семантические связи со средой 
человеческих организмов и не-людей (non-humans) очерчены в феноменологии 
субъектно ориентированных исследованиях индивидуального опыта. У животных 
отмечаются значимые контакты с внешней реальностью посредством их тела, но так 
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как они закованы в своем теле, то они не могут постичь самих вещей и их разных форм 
проявления. Во второй части статьи эксплицируется повседневный фон семиотической 
феноменологии и рассматриваются способы существования животных и человеческих 
субъектов в терминах трансцендентности как «бытия–в-мире» и «бытия-для-мира». 
Имманентные субъекты существуют в своей среде, а трансцендентные способны 
выйти из своего жизненного мира. В соответствии с положительно маркированными 
или немаркированными интерпретациями существования и жизни в субъективных 
мирах людей и животных, отмеченных другими психологами и философами, автор 
приходит к выводу, что расширение поля исследования реальности может обогатить 
экзистенциальную семиотику, если бы связи организмов с миром рассматривались 
бы с точки зрения возникновения их мира, а возникновение их мира – как результат 
взаимодействия разных организмов.
Omailm, Lebenswelt ja Dasein läbi tegelikkkuse 
subjektiivse kogemise prisma
Lähtudes hinnangutest loomade (omailm) ja inimeste (Lebenswelt ja Dasein) eksistentsiaalsetele 
universumitele, käsitletakse käesolevas artiklis mitmeid vaateid subjektiivsele kogemusele 
ehk loodus- ja kultuurifilosoofias välja töötatud tegelikkust modelleerivatele süsteemidele. 
Esimeses osas uuritakse, kuidas mitteinimeste ja inimorganismide semantilised suhted nende 
keskkonnaga on visandatud fenomenoloogias kui individuaalse kogemuse uurimises subjektile 
orienteeritud vaatevinklist. Loomadel omakorda mööndakse olevat tähendusrikkad suhted 
tegelike asjadega vaadeldavas reaalsuses nende kehade väliste laienduste kaudu, ent väidetakse, 
et neil puudub otsene ligipääs asjadele iseeneses ja nende mitmesugustele esinemisvormidele, 
sest nad ei suuda ületada vangistatust neid ümbritsevasse. Teises osas, milles tuuakse esile 
semiootilise fenomenoloogia argine taust, vaadeldakse loom- ja inimsubjektide eksisteerimise 
viise ‘maailmas olemise’ kui immanentsuse ja ‘maailma jaoks olemise’ kui transtsendentsuse 
terminites. Immanentsed subjektid leitakse eksisteerivat oma keskkonnas, ja transtsendentsed 
subjektid osutuvad võimelisteks oma eluilmast väljapoole liikuma. Kooskõlas eksistentsi ja elu 
positiivselt markeeritud või markeerimata tõlgendusega inimeste ja loomade subjektiivsetes 
universumites, mida on teinud teised filosoofid ja psühholoogid, jõuab autor järeldusele, 
et reaalsuse ja maalma uurimise laiendamine võiks rikastada eksistentsiaalse semiootika 
raamistikku, kui organismide sidemeid maailmaga, millest nad elavad, vaadeldaks nende 
maailma tekkimise vaatepunktist ja maailma tekkimist nende omavahelise vastastikmõju 
tulemusena. 
